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The European Commission and the Public Governance of Interest Groups 
in the European Union: seeking a niche between accreditation and 
laissez-faire. 
 
Justin Greenwood and Darren Halpini 
 
Abstract: As interest groups participate in public policy, so demands arise 
for the regulation of their input.  These vary between purposeful laissez-
faire, and accreditation in return for norm observance, with attempts to find 
points between these often focusing on supervised and/or incentivised self-
regulation.  We classify the EU system as ‘de-facto’ accreditation, based 
around generalised and ill-defined notions, and on preferences for the 
simplification of consultative life and to screen out outsider groups with a 
narrow membership basis which don’t follow the ‘rules of the game’.  The 
operationalisation of ‘representativity’ criteria carries with it the danger of 
privileging certain categories of groups over other types of groups.   A wider 
legitimacy basis is suggested by a limited comparative literature, a 
sharpening of the concept of accountability, and types of interest groups. 
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If nothing else, interest groups exercise ‘voice’ in the public arena.  However, 
when they are drawn any closer to policy making processes, their involvement 
raises questions of legitimacy.  Such concerns find expression as ‘lobby 
regulation,’ often narrowly drawn for the avoidance of excess and undue 
influence.  More broadly, however, are questions about what should be 
expected of what is often referred to as organised civil society (but turns out to 
be interest groups) ‘participation’ in public governance, and it is these issues 
we seek to address.   The boundary between ‘voice’ and ‘participation’ is 
elusive and presents practical problems which generally point the would-be 
regulator down a road leading to self-regulatory models.  But the questions 
centre on concepts of accountability and internal deliberation, transparency, 
the basis of group ‘constituency’ (whether membership or conceptual), and the 
transmission of information to the public domain.  
 
In this article we examine these broader issues with respect to the European 
polity. The dispersal of authority and institutional players arising from the 
multi-level governance nature of the EU makes regulation of its exchanges 
with interest groups problematic.  Nonetheless, the European Commission’s 
various powers and roles in the EU policy process make it the principal 
interlocutor of interest groups.  Whilst a variety of exchanges exist, with 
varying degrees of institutionalisation and formality, there has been a 
concerted effort to systematise these exchanges as part of an effort to improve 
the legitimacy of EU policy-making derived from opportunities for participation.  
The thrust of these has gone beyond simple issues of probity to a system 
aimed at achieving a ‘level-playing field’ of access to policy-making through 
empowering citizen interest groups (Greenwood, 2007).  Following a wider 
contextual discussion about the expectations generated by group participation, 
a content analysis of the European Commission’s various schemes of engaging 
with interest groups follows, leading to a conclusion that these amount to de-
facto accreditation and which constitute a somewhat blunt instrument.  We 
continue by examining the way in which this approach has potential knock-on 
effects in terms of political inclusion. Taking existing positions of i) formal 
accreditation and ii) a ‘market place for ideas’ as a point of departure, we 
explore where some of the  middle ground might fall.  Whilst diverse 
motivations are listed by the Commission for regulation, we later develop the 
possibility that current concerns by the Commission – despite rhetorical 
discussions over democratic deficit and accountability – are driven by desires 
to make consultation more manageable, and in finding a way to remove the 
need to engage with aggressive outsiders who appear to be little more than 
one-person and a web-site activists.  A concluding statement concurs with an 
emerging consensus from the literature that increased status in public policy 
making implies increased scrutiny, but argues that a robust application of one-
size-fits-all rules of internal group democracy would be counterproductive.  
Some wider contextual assurance standards very recently developed by citizen 
interest groups seem to point the way forward for input legitimacy, particularly 
when placed in a more formalised regulatory context.  
 
Interest groups are key actors in contemporary forms of governance 
throughout the western world. Civil servants seek group input, because they 
may have expertise, assist with implementation or they add democratic 
legitimacy to the outcome. Put in Easton’s terms of input/output legitimacy 
(Easton, 1965), the former two points aid output legitimacy, and the latter 
input legitimacy. A salient point here is that groups may bring benefits to the 
policy process. But, clearly, disbenefits are possible. Some accounts see them 
as rent-seeking cartels interfering with the wealth creation process (Olson, 
1982), and some see groups as monopolising elites undermining public 
governance. Groups may lack resources and expertise or advocacy, may be 
based on faulty, biased or contrived thinking and/or research (hence 
undermining their contribution to output legitimacy), groups may lack 
authority and democratic legitimacy with those they purport to advocate for 
(hence undermining input legitimacy), and they may contribute to system 
overload.  
 
Given these issues it is no surprise that questions arise over the need to 
regulate group access to the public policy process.  The EU context is chosen 
because substantial tensions have recently arisen from its reliance upon 
groups to act as a substantial secondary channel of input legitimacy due to 
core weaknesses in EU representative democracy.  Among the most distinctive 
features of EU interest representation are the federated (associations of 
associations) nature of most EU interest groups, the reliance upon groups to 
contribute to a wide range of functions broadly identified as output and input 
legitimacy (together with the resource deficits of political institutions), and as a 
channel of political communication between supranational and 
intergovernmental forces.  EU interest groups are highly institutionalised for 
these roles, with the European Commission playing an exceptionally vigorous 
role in group formation and maintenance, particularly among citizen interest 
groups.  Around 2% of the entire EU budget - €2000,000,000 - is spent on 
projects through interest groups (Kallas, 2005). As such, if pressure to 
regulate interest group activity is likely to arise anywhere, it is in an EU 
context.  
 
It is possible to crudely present the contending views on the issue of regulation 
as falling into two opposing camps. On the one hand, some argue that only 
groups with internal democratic structures or similar should be given access. 
In the European context, Warleigh (2000; 2001) is particularly ‘sceptical’ of 
the potential democratising effects of the EU’s engagement with citizen interest 
groups. His empirical examination of so-called ‘consumer’, ‘environmental’ and 
‘social policy/civil liberties’ groups active at the EU level (both European and 
national) revealed that most groups examined had poorly functioning internal 
democratic processes and failed to facilitate high levels of engagement with 
the European policy process among their members or supporters (Warleigh 
2001). An emerging conclusion seemed to be that yielding positive benefits 
from engaging with interest groups requires a system of tests to ensure that 
they are ‘representative’. In the absence of the requisite standards of 
representativeness, groups in this account should be excluded from policy 
processes and governmental institutions. For instance, Warleigh proposes that 
the EU establish the representativeness of groups before allowing them access 
to the policy process. He concludes that ‘... the Union should impose a 
different kind of conditionality: NGOs must address their internal democracy as 
the price of access to EU decision-makers’ (2001, p. 636). As will become 
evident below, this approach finds echoes in the practice of other transnational 
political institutions. However, as the analysis will show, the various European 
institutions are clear on some need to scrutinise representativeness and 
accountability, but settle primarily on de-facto resolutions. Further, EU 
institutions equivocate on what representativeness means: for instance, is it 
geographical coverage or accountability in decision making to member 
organisations.   
 
At the other end of the spectrum are contributions such as that by Wolf 
(2006), which argues that in a market place of ideas there is little justification 
for vetting access for any group – regardless of view, internal structure or 
funding source. He distinguishes legitimacy granted by processes of 
authorisation – such as that delivered by internal democratic decision making 
– with the acceptance of a group as ‘an authority’ by virtue of other forms of 
legitimacy. So what may these other forms of legitimacy be? A consensus of 
much of the literature (most of which originates in analysis of global civil 
society) asserts that group legitimacy arises in various forms (see Keck and 
Sikkink (1998); van Rooy 2004). Van Rooy, for instance, identifies 
‘representation’  as a core source of democratic legitimacy, focusing on dual 
criteria of membership (size, breadth and depth) and internal democracy 
(election, control, accountability) (van Rooy 2004, pp.63-97). However she 
also identifies other sources of legitimacy such as ‘victim hood’, ‘expertise’, 
‘experiential evidence’, and ‘moral authority’. The extent to which these ‘other’ 
forms of legitimacy enhance or undermine democratic (‘representative’) 
legitimacy is a question of some considerable debate. Some, van Rooy (2004) 
included, see these as supplementary, and thus second best, to democratic 
legitimacy. Others see them as being not inconsistent. For instance, Risse 
(2006), in an analysis of new modes of (transnational EU) governance likens 
the public voices of NGOs as constituting a deliberative form of democracy 
(with democratic legitimacy flowing from that), and points to external 
accountability as being more pertinent than internal flows (down to 
supporters). This emphasis upon public accountability finds echoes in a 
‘European Transparency Initiative’ (ETI) proposed by the European 
Commission in May 2006 (European Commission, 2006a), in which an issue 
about distorted information concerning the likely impact of policy proposals 
being placed in the public domain by civil society organisations is specifically 
identified as a regulatory issue. 
 
Some authors pursue a middle ground. Typical of these is one offered by 
Edwards and Zadek (2002, op.cit. van Rooy 2004, p. 138), who argue that 
‘any non-state actor is entitled to voice an opinion....But negotiating a treaty is 
a very different manner, in which detailed rules may be essential to preserve 
genuine democracy in decision making. In this case, legitimacy through 
representation is essential’. The argument here is that if a group seeks only to 
voice an opinion on the world stage, then it need not require internal 
democratic processes to generate democratic legitimacy, but that participation 
in public policy making does raise public accountability issues.  Citizen interest 
groups have themselves responded to a legacy of wider challenges upon their 
legitimacy, most recently in June 2006 by developing (through an alliance of 
some of the leading ‘brands’) an International NGO Accountability Charter, 
defining accountability in the widest possible sense, and embracing a series of 
detailed principles which extend to the standards of information placed in the 
public domain (Amnesty International, 2006).  A recent core statement of 
principles from the leadership of the EU citizen interest group community 
identifies authority and expertise, coupled with trust and reputation, and 
performance, as the basis of their legitimacy (Fazi and Smith, 2006).  With a 
caveat that the last of these may be self-interested criteria definition aimed at 
securing a place at the top of an accreditation tree, these developments do 
reveal an acceptance by mainstream citizen groups of the legitimacy of the 
accountability agenda.  Another is a proposed ‘European Union Concordat’ 
(NCVO, 2006) to mirror ‘compacts’ developed at in a number of national 
contexts (most notably in Estonia and the UK) between national governments 
and lead voluntary sector organisations.  These national compacts include 
statements of mutual obligations and expectations without being legally 
binding, and commit organisations to indicate how interests were involved in 
formulating their positions and to present accurate information based on 
unbiased research.  The proposed EU Concordat version, however, asks much 
less from civil society organisations compared to some national variants, with 
all of its 9 statements primarily focused upon what the EU institutions shall 
deliver, including demands that consultation should not happen during the 
summer, and shall be available in non-EU languages.  The main concession 
offered from civil society organisations would be a more generalised 
mechanism of explaining how they arrived at their response (NCVO, 2006). 
 
This debate exists against the backdrop of a more general theoretical 
discussion regarding the role of ‘groups’ in democratic life. Those concerned 
with social capital emphasise the internal participative element of groups as 
important, while some deliberative democrats see groups as simple catalysts 
for public deliberation of important issues.  But perhaps the most ambitious 
reworking of the potential for groups in addressing democratic deficit has been 
that of the associative democrats who advocate a primary role for associations 
in linking citizens and governing institutions (see Cohen and Rogers 1992; 
Hirst 1994). There is even the talk of a revitalization of neo-corporatism (even 
macro-corporatism) in the European context (e.g. Schmitter and Grote, 1997). 
In such formulations the internal democracy of groups is a critical 
characteristic determining the capacity of groups to deliver on democratic 
potential. The debate over the importance of internal democracy is of both 
practical and theoretical salience, particularly in an EU context given the 
discursive use that the European Commission makes of the concept of civil 
society for legitimation purposes.   
 
But there is an argument to suggest that internal democracies – even if they 
could be established – are less important for legitimating the advocacy of groups 
pursuing the interests of non-humans and future generations than groups 
pursuing the interests of humans (Halpin 2006). There is no dispute about the 
empirical finding that many groups lack internal democratic procedures and 
practices. Rather, the implicit judgement that this is automatically a ‘deficiency’ 
can be challenged. Some groups – those that pursue the interests of 
constituencies without the prospects of ‘presence’ or ‘voice’ – cannot bring into 
membership those they advocate for. Extending democratic processes to affiliates 
is not clearly going to aid the legitimacy of the group’s advocacy (for opposing 
view see Eckersley 1999). For example, if the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
does not extend direct participatory opportunities to its supporters, it is not a 
deficiency so much as simply a by-product of its status as an advocate for nature. 
Executing this advocacy task is not assisted by understanding the collective will of 
affiliates (although it is likely that the bulk of affiliates have a high degree of 
support for very generalised environmental goals).  From this perspective, in 
terms of regulating group advocacy, accreditation on the basis of internal 
democracies, much as seems to be promoted by Warleigh (2001), would be 
problematic. It would lead to many groups unable to develop internal 
democracies involving their constituencies being excluded. Similarly, groups that 
could at least in principle draw their constituency into membership, but do not, 
would be excluded under the more narrow definition of representation defined 
above. This would put projects of political exclusion at cross purposes with 
projects for democratisation. Many politically marginalised and unpopular social 
groups lack the resources to effectively mobilise collectively. While there is some 
caution over benevolent advocacy on their behalf (speaking for those with voice is 
unfashionable), insisting on internal democracy and participation as a pre-
requisite to access would simply remove a large number of citizen groups from 
formalised political forums.  Ensuring the political inclusion and voice (through 
benevolent groups) for the marginalised and less powerful in society seems an 
over-riding consideration. 
 
The above debate assumes that input legitimacy is at question. However, none 
of the above deals with governability issues. That is, the debate does not help 
where the problem is not increasing the democratic legitimacy of individual 
groups, but in rationalising the vast (and growing) group system. It is 
undoubtedly true that the types of risks inherent in group exchanges with 
policy makers can be eradicated by ‘reputational’ decisions. That is to say, 
policy makers simply avoid or refuse contact with those who have not proven 
their worth on one of the bases described; while outsiders by choice rule 
themselves out (content to massage public opinion and exert pressure from 
outside). Indeed, this is the sort of informal approach adopted by Florini 
(2000, 236; cited in Sikkink 2002, 315), who argues that poor and inaccurate 
arguments and ideas are eventually picked up by supporters, who will seek 
change through voice, or ultimately exit. As such, a ‘market place for ideas’ is 
self-regulating. But a system in which the procedures required of public 
administrators in engaging with outside interests do not permit the selective 
exclusion of interests requires the development of transparent regulatory 
criteria to manage engagement with groups.  
 
Group accreditation seems to offer the prospect of a regulatory tool with which 
to shape the qualities valued in groups. Each of the benefits of expertise, 
democratic legitimacy and implementation, can be emphasised or de-
emphasised. In addition, concerns over governability can drive the debate. In 
the case of supranational governmental institutions, it is clearly the case that 
emphases have shifted. Initial focus upon the resources groups can bring by 
way of expertise and monitoring/implementation issues tends to give way to 
more fundamental agendas for groups among transnational institutions 
because of their structural remoteness from civil society.  In this setting, 
interest groups are cast as agents through which transnational institutions can 
engage with a global citizenry. One key aspiration for groups in this setting can 
be to help plug democratic deficits that emerge from the absence of sufficient 
mechanisms of accountability and authorisation between global citizens and 
the decision makers in such institutions.  
 
In the case of the EU, there is clearly a high degree of uncertainty over what 
problems need fixing.  This flows through into the types of criteria that are 
promoted as necessary tests for group access. While there is ample literature 
with respect to the EU group system- its growth and constitution – and with 
respect to the development of accreditation, there is little treatment of the debate 
internal to the Commission about how to juggle goals of democratic inclusion with 
those of governability. Whilst the Commission identifies core policy problems of 
governability issues and demand overload, they equivocate on how best to 
achieve this, talking of representativity but without any clarity or consistency as 
to what that may mean. This ambiguity seems to catalyse a debate among 
groups themselves, with groups trying to shape criteria for access developed in 
their own image.  We argue that the EU, as with many governmental 
organisations, faces a difficulty in balancing two key priorities surrounding its 
engagement with interest groups. On the one hand it needs groups to enhance 
output and input legitimacy, i.e. to enhance its capacity to deliver good policy and 
to legitimate its authority in democratic terms. On the other hand, it needs to 
ensure governability. As such, it needs to choose who it engages with well, with 
criteria that focuses on resources and expertise but also democratic credentials.  
These are clearly difficult imperatives to balance, arguably even harder for the EU 
given its basic deficiencies in terms of policy capacity (small civil service etc) and 
democratic credentials (relying on weak forms of authorisation and accountability 
to European citizens).  
 
Against this backdrop we examine the debate within the European Commission 
with respect to the accreditation of groups. We discover the debate over formal 
accreditation, its dismissal, and then the development of a de-facto form of 
accreditation. The European Commission, through its de-facto system of group 
accreditation, fails to reflect the difficulties, foreshadowed in the literature, over 
developing criteria by which to limit group access. We speculate over a possible 
middle road, a ‘third way’  that may better reflect the dual needs of governability 
and democratisation, but resist the temptation to demand groups adhere to a 
democratic practice that many cannot reproduce. 
 
The European Commission and Groups: Shifting expectations? 
 
There is some general acceptance of the notion that supranational forms of 
government (as compared to nation states) tend to rely more heavily on groups. 
Put crudely, the lack of resources, autonomous capacity and direct accountability 
to citizens, arguably make them more reliant on groups than national governing 
institutions (e.g. parliaments, civil servants or governments). The secretariats of 
international governmental organizations – such as the UN and the Council of 
Europe – have formalised accreditation schemes for groups based around the role 
of groups as a source of legitimacy (separate from working through consent from 
national governments) and a way to garner resources and to help monitor 
governmental activities and hold them to account to international norms. These 
roles are explicitly valued in the EU context also, although as we argue later the 
accreditation scheme is of a de-facto rather than de-jure nature. 
 
The role of groups in the EU political system is now codified by the 2004 
(unratified) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, where the Chapter on 
the ‘Democratic Life of the Union’ includes Article 47 on the principle of 
participatory democracy, in which clauses make explicit reference to interaction 
by EU political institutions with civil society, organised or otherwise. As with other 
supranational governmental organisations, the EU has slowly shifted its rhetorical 
emphasis on groups as a necessary source of expertise and implementation 
power (to aid output legitimacy) towards an emphasis on groups as agents to 
enhance core democratic functions through participation (to aid input legitimacy). 
Over time, the European Commission has sought to make its interaction with 
groups systematic, developing mechanisms beyond those concerned with probity 
towards transparency, broadening participation, and equity (Commission, 1992), 
and to empowering the ability of groups to act as mutual checks and balances 
and as agents of system accountability.  But this degree of institutionalisation of 
interest groups brings a ‘responsibilities with rights’ agenda, captured in the 
European Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance (WPG): 
 
‘With better involvement comes greater responsibility.  Civil society must 
itself follow the principles of good governance, which include accountability 
and openness.  The Commission intends to establish a comprehensive on-
line database with details of civil society organisations active at European 
level, which should act as a catalyst to improve their internal organisation.’ 
(European Commission, 2001, p.15) 
 
‘Creating a culture of consultation ...should be underpinned by a code of 
conduct that sets minimum standards...These standards should improve the 
representativity of civil society organisations and structure their debate with 
the Institutions.’ (op. cit., p.17) 
 
‘In some policy sectors, where consultative practices are already well 
established, the Commission could develop more extensive partnership 
arrangements.  On the Commission’s part, this will entail a commitment for 
additional consultations compared to the minimum standards.  In return, 
the arrangements will prompt civil society organisations to tighten up their 
internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity, 
and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the Member 
States’ (ibid.p.17). 
 
These quotations make two points apparent. They firstly make clear that the 
Commission has raised its expectations of the benefits that can ensue from 
engaging with groups. It provides a democratic rationale for engagement. Raising 
input legitimacy is clearly a new, and arguably more important, priority. 
Secondly, there is recognition that in order to reap such benefits some tighter 
controls on group access may be necessary. As will be revealed, the latter 
conclusion has opened up a difficult issue over accreditation.  
 
 Is there a European Commission group accreditation system and what 
group qualities are promoted? 
 
The adoption by the Commission of the view that they need to scrutinise groups 
in order to accrue democratic dividends from an engagement with groups raises 
the question of accreditation, and in particular what type of system (if any) does 
it use, and what type of criteria is employed?   
 
Responses to the White Paper on Governance confirmed earlier statements in 
the Commission proclaiming no formal system. The European Parliament had 
stated that 
 
‘however indispensable it may be to consult relevant groups and experts 
when drafting legislative proposals in particular, it should not be allowed to 
add a further level of bureaucracy, for instance in the form of “accredited 
organisations” or “organisations with partnership agreements”.’ (European 
Parliament, 2001; para 11e) 
 
‘the creation of consultation standards must not be tied to any quid pro quo 
on the part of organisations of civil society because independent and critical 
public opinion is essential for a vibrant democracy’ (ibid., para. 12). 
 
 
This reaction against a formal system of accreditation seems to have been borne 
out in a de jure sense but had little impact de-facto because, as is acknowledged 
by leading sources in the Brussels citizen interest group community, a system is 
in place in all but name (Fazi and Smith, 2006). This paradox, of a Commission in 
formal denial yet continuing in practice has been ever present. The Secretariat 
General of the European Commission, the lead service for overall relations with 
organised civil society, has consistently made statements which seem to reject a 
de jure accreditation scheme. Moreover it seems to endorse the ‘market place of 
ideas’ view on interest group regulation through its assertions on an accreditation 
system.  The long established position remains in force, that  
 
‘The Commission has a general policy not to grant privileges to special 
interest groups, such as the issuing of entry passes and favoured access to 
information.  Nor does it give associations an official endorsement by 
granting them consultative status.  This is because the Commission has 
always wanted to maintain a dialogue which is as open as possible with all 
interested parties’ (Commission, 1992, p.4). 
 
We find evidence to support the view on the ground among groups in Brussels 
that a de-facto scheme does exist, albeit that the criteria it uses to judge groups 
– the qualities it seeks to foster among groups using de-facto accreditation as a 
tool – tend to suggest the Commission sees its biggest aim as rendering 
consultation more manageable through federal structures with encompassing EU 
coverage.   
 
Virtually any bureaucracy in a democratic setting likes organisations that are 
authoritative and credible as a representative of a constituency (broadly 
conceived), have as broad a coverage as is possible as a means to simplify 
consultative life, avoid input overload, enhance two-way communication with civil 
society, and play to the rules of institutionalised exchanges.  As is evident, the 
territorial scale of the Commission’s remit and the particular problems of 
democratic legitimacy it faces lead it towards an official preference for particular 
types of groups.  A statement of ‘guiding principles’ to govern its relations with 
interest groups current on the web pages of the Secretariat General records that 
the Commission tends to favour European federations (i.e. associations of 
national associations) over individuals (companies or citizens) or national 
organizations.ii Although practice tends to differ somewhat across the 
organisation, the continued official preference for federations is borne of its wish, 
visible in WPG statements, for ‘one stop’ EU associations which are broadly 
representative in terms of geographic coverage.  These carry a much greater 
subtlety over the question of their application in any scheme of accreditation. 
 
The White Paper on Governance was used by the European Commission to 
upgrade the status of its public database of interest groups, CONECCS 
(Consultation, the European Commission, and Civil Society).  The database had 
been developed from 1996 (and 2002 in public web format) as a measure to 
assist with making consultation with outside interests more systematic and 
transparent, designed for use across the Commission services as a means to 
ensure that the relevant consultation partners could be located, thus providing an 
incentive upon groups for inclusion:   
 
‘The database enables both the general public and civil society organisations 
themselves to see what voices might be heard in the Commission's 
consultation processes, both within structured consultation forums and on a 
more informal basis. 
 
It provides a means for European civil society organisations to make 
themselves known to the Commission, thus increasing the list of potential 
consultation partners. 
 
It is a tool that can be used by the Commission itself to identify the 
appropriate mix of consultation partners who can offer the necessary 
geographical/sectoral/target group coverage.’iii 
 
 
These statements make it quite clear that failure to achieve access to the 
database carries with it the possibility of being overlooked in consultation 
exercises. Groups such as Statewatch have made much of the way in which the 
entry rules to the database (outlined below) seem to exclude them from access to 
it, although there is as yet no evidence that groups are receiving either 
preferential or second-rate access to the Commission based upon their presence 
or otherwise in the CONECCS database.  At this stage, the important point to note 
is whether the database is a de-facto accreditation scheme in the making, a 
prospect floated in the Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative 
(European Commission, 2006a).  Whilst the Commission has consistently stated 
that its CONECCS database is not an accreditation scheme of any kind, and nor is 
it intended to confer special privileges,iv an increasing number of entry thresholds 
have been placed upon groups since the White Paper on Governance which seem 
to enforce preferences for ‘extensive partnership arrangements’ in return for the 
observance of certain norms.  The Commission reflects that  
 
‘the minimum standards for consultation currently applied by the 
Commission also suggest strengthening the transparency and accountability 
of those involved in dialogue and consultation.’v  
 
The Commission reserves the right not to include an organisation in the 
database if it does not satisfy the stated requirements, or to remove 
subsequently any organisation which it discovers does not, or has ceased 
to, satisfy those requirements.’vi  
 Groups are required to confirm certain statements about themselves before 
access is granted.  These include having members in at least 3 EU or candidate 
countries, the authority to speak for their members, and that they operate in an 
accountable manner.   We return to the issue of accountability later, but note 
here the emphasis upon representativeness as a geographic quality.  Groups 
representing a ‘what’ rather than a ‘who’, such as ‘Statewatch,’ are denied access 
on this basis.   
 
If entrants to the CONECCS database hold a place on one of the Commission’s 
Advisory Committees, which carry financial support, further requirements are 
made of them which appear to link the scheme beyond a simple ‘telephone 
directory’ concept to a process that reinforces norms of accountability and 
representativeness (however they may be defined).  Thus, such groups are 
required to detail the spread of member state and candidate countries 
represented by their membership, a list of their member organisations, and the 
proportion of their income derived from different sources. While at first glance 
this appears onerous, again it reinforces the ‘preference’ of the Commission for 
peak groups with EU wide geographical coverage: the issue is of curtailing 
overload.  
 
The criteria for ‘representative’ carries with it a degree of qualification in that the 
reference to ‘member’ embraces member groups of federations.  Most (though 
not all) EU interest groups are associations of a relatively small number of 
(predominantly, national) associations. For such groups, to satisfy the ‘test’ 
requires only that national member organisations are consulted by the EU 
umbrella group. This does not necessarily imply that any individual companies or 
citizens that may be members of national organisations are consulted, and as 
such is clearly problematic in terms of representative or participatory standards.  
The alternative to confederated status is mainly to be found among EU business 
associations, where direct company membership formats exist in which the 
application of representativity criteria present few problems for groups beyond 
explaining their predomination by large enterprises.  Almost no EU political action 
groups have a significant individual citizen membership basis.  In the citizen 
domain, the presence of non-confederated groups active in EU policy-making 
include those which are policy offices of international organisations geared to 
engaging in institutional dialogue (such as Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature), and a very small number of ‘activist’ cells strongly connected to 
wider social movements (often, anti-globalisation) which are heavily dependent 
upon a single individual and a web site.  As the latter type of organisation employ 
‘outsider’ tactics alongside institutional participation, they present a problem in a 
highly institutionalised system of group participation such as the EU, where 
groups are expected to perform systemic functions.  Regulatory effort may be 
disproportionately directed towards this type of groups, with the CONECCS 
system presently used as a quasi accreditation system.  In sum, a sledgehammer 
is wielded in the direction of a small nut which is not fully signed up to the ‘rules 
of the game.’ 
 
The 2002 Commission Communication on consultation standards records that: 
 
‘openness and accountability are important principles for the conduct of 
organisations when they are seeking to contribute to EU policy 
development.  It must be apparent: 
- which interests they represent 
- how inclusive that representation is. 
 
Interested parties that wish to submit comments on a policy proposal by the 
Commission must therefore be ready to provide the Commission and the 
public at large with the information described above...if this information is 
not provided, submissions will be considered as individual contributions’ 
(European Commission, 2002a, p.17; emphasis added).   
 
In November 2005, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security issued a 
Communication seeking to develop a code of conduct for ‘non-profit 
organisations’ to promote transparency and accountability best practices 
(European Commission, 2005a).  Whilst initially focused upon the need to prevent 
groups being used as a vehicle for terrorist funding, it strays beyond this agenda 
to recommend enhanced standards of transparency as good practice to raise the 
question as to whether Community funding of ‘non-profit organisations’ could be 
linked to enhanced transparency and accountability measures, and whether the 
registration of such organisations as lobby organisations could be made 
conditional with the compliance of the Code.  These appear to have been deferred 
pending consultation on the Commission’s May 2006 Green (i.e. consultative) 
Paper on a European Transparency Initiative in which it (initially) proposes ‘a 
voluntary registration system, run by the Commission, with clear incentives for 
lobbyistsvii to register.  This system would consist of a web-based voluntary 
registration system for all lobbyists who wish to be consulted on EU initiatives.’viii  
The original proposal for the ETI (European Commission 2005b) explicitly raises 
the prospect that an expanded version of the CONECCS database could provide 
the basis for such a system.  Using CONECCS as a regulatory vehicle has never 
been far from the surface since its web launch in 2002, with its access criteria 
providing a de-facto accreditation basis. 
 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn here is about the group 
qualities being assessed and their contribution to either input or output 
legitimacy. Despite the White Paper’s emphasis on group engagement ‘upping’ 
input legitimacy, it appears from the above that the subsequent debate within the 
Commission, and its limited practice, support the conclusion that it sees 
accreditation (de-facto, although it continues to be in denial viz. a de jure 
scheme) as addressing a variety of issues.  These range from the control of 
‘lobbying excesses’ (probity, overcrowding) through to broader issues of 
transparency, accountability, group representativity, and a level-playing field for 
participation. A new emphasis in the most recent of initiatives lies upon the issue 
of public accountability for the accuracy of information when groups participate in 
policy-making. Where the term representativity is often deployed, it turns out to 
be operationalised in terms of encompassingness (peak federations) and 
geographical coverage (funnelling MS groups into a single voice). These type of 
‘group qualities’ do not really assist in ascertaining contribution to democratic 
legitimacy (beyond a simple notion that the interests of any one sector are 
organised across all nation states) as they do about demand management, 
enhancing governability and reducing overload. What is not really considered is 
whether accreditation should extend to internal group democracy.  
 
Interest Group Accreditation: The Response of EU Interest Groups 
 
The reactions of EU interest groups to the debate over accreditation reflects the 
ambiguity created by the Commissions over use of the term representativity. Is it 
scope or territorial coverage? Is it internal democracy? 
 
While the close observer may deduce the Commission’s overriding concern as 
centred upon controlling overload, groups themselves have tried to re-define the 
term to suit their own purposes. The Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the principal EU business group, has 
advocated an accreditation scheme with criteria which very closely reflects its 
own status as a designated principal social partner organisation.  These are based 
upon a high threshold of ‘representativity’ criteria, centred upon geographic 
coverage and the ability of members to speak in turn for their own constituencies.  
The criteria was established by the European Commission for the principal EU 
social partner organisations, as these are empowered to enter into the drafting of 
EU legislation in employment related fields, and would be a challenge for many (if 
not most) EU interest groups to meet.   Additional to these criteria is UNICE’s 
proposal that organisations must be demonstrably independent of public 
authorities in terms of finance, a measure which would exclude virtually every 
citizen interest organisation operating at EU level from accreditation (Jacobs, 
2003), in that most have funding from EU political institutions. 
  
The elite of EU citizen interest organisations have also taken sides on the concept 
and detail of the accreditation debate in somewhat predictable ways. The leading 
European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC) was active in promoting access 
criteria to the European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG), a formal 
consultative group of the European Commission involving structured dialogue 
with national and EU consumer organisations.  The ECCG now carries strict 
eligibility criteria, based upon geographic representativeness and centrality of 
consumer missionix, reflecting BEUC’s long and largely successful mission to 
establish itself as the principal EU consumer organisation and to see off its rivals.  
On the other hand, the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) is ill suited for any 
system of accreditation (ECAS, 2004).  ECAS  
 
‘argued strongly that it would be wrong to introduce any system of 
accreditation of the kind introduced by international organisations – that the 
Commission should keep an open door to any NGO that wished to put 
forward its views – and that consultation should go wider than the Brussels 
‘inner circle’’ (ECAS, 2005, p.5). 
 
The European Social Platform has accepted from the outset of the Commission’s 
deliberations the principle of geographic representativeness for EU groups to 
observe (European Social Platform, 2000).  It has also expressed concerns about 
the way in which internet based consultations could obscure the extent to which a 
responding organisation is representative, construed in terms of ensuring a group 
is actually pursuing the interests it claims (Social Platform, 2002).  As a ‘family’ of 
leading EU level citizen interest organisations in the social domain (currently with 
38 members) it would itself have little difficulty with demonstrating its breadth of 
functional coverage of EU groups in the social domain. These properties ensure it 
already enjoys a de-facto ‘partnership arrangement’ in its dialogue with EU 
institutions, borne of a history as a creation of EU institutions charged with 
creating a ‘civil dialogue’ (Geyer, 2001).x  It has sought to consolidate the 
benefits it derives from its de-facto ‘accreditation’ and the exclusiveness this 
entails by ‘asking the Commission for a consultative status on grounds similar to 
the Council of Europe system’ (European Commission, 2005c, p.5).  Arguing for 
the highest level of financial support to be reserved for it, the Platform has very 
recently stated  
 
‘we believe…that the future programme should also provide lower levels of 
support to other NGO networks which can prove that they can bring a useful 
contribution to the EU debate and can help involve citizens in the process’ 
(Cullen, 2005, p.17). 
 
The Social Platform hosts the Civil Society Contact Group, a ‘family of families’ of 
citizen interest groups in different cognate domains.  A former Chair  argued 
when in office that  
 
‘I personally do believe that we will need to have a system of accreditation 
for NGOs...I believe that NGOs need to establish criteria for transparency in 
relation to decision making, in relation to membership, accountability and 
funding.’ (Alhadeff, 2003, p.103)   
 
The European Environmental Bureau (EEB) is another ‘family’ organisation which 
has followed its interests by favouring an accreditation system (Fazi and Smith, 
2006).  Like the Social Platform, the EEB is a creation of the Commission for 
institutionalised dialogue purposes, and remains the lead player in the formal 
dialogue between DG Environment and the ‘G10’ informal grouping of 
environmental organisations.  Like the Social Platform, accreditation would 
formalise its status, and give it an institutionalised edge over other G10 members 
(mainly European branches of international organisations) as a dedicated EU 
federation. 
 
Such organisations, easily able to meet geographic representativeness criteria on 
the basis of their confederated nature, would thus place themselves in a powerful 
institutionalised governance position for the wider world of EU NGOs and their 
access to political institutions.  But an open question here is what is meant by 
accountability, and in particular to who and over what?  Concepts such as 
‘representativeness’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ become synonyms, and 
statements such as those above, without any further accompanying explanation, 
contain some degree of ambiguity.   
 
These problematics in turn raise a series of further questions.  The first of these 
concern which type of organisations, if any, should be granted an elevated status 
through accreditation criteria, and how such criteria could be formulated.   One 
approach is to abandon any attempt at differentiation in a ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
approach, accepting that legitimacy of a kind arises as opinion is voiced and 
challenged in the political system.  This is popular among a number of EU NGOs 
and national NGOs with significant orientations, stressing the way in which 
‘representativeness’ can arise from a breadth of participation of civil society 
organisations (Fazi and Smith, 2006).  But this becomes problematic when a 
group seek to participate in the formulation, or/and delivery, of public policy, 
because it enters the arena of public governance, and there is a continuing legacy 
of contributions from civil society organisations which have fallen short of public 
probity, particularly on standards of information placed in the public domain, and 
which appear to amount to more than isolated examples (see, for instance, Bond, 
2000).  Yet can a boundary point between groups ‘exercising voice’ and ‘direct 
engagement’ be satisfactorily defined?  What standards should be applied beyond 
the boundary point when putting forward ideas becomes political participation, 
and by whom?  Can a system devise rules to protect against any one group from 
challenging democratic legitimacy by securing a disproportionate influence on the 
basis of ownership of superior time or/and financial resources?  It is apparent 
from various lobby regulation schemes that there are more questions than 
solutions to even minimalist concerns of public probity, let alone the wider 
questions we can do little more than pose.  Our earlier review indicated some of 
the suggestions which have arisen relating to standards which could reasonably 
be developed for observation among policy participants.  This is relatively 
unproblematic for public bureaucracies able to govern the behaviour of civil 
servants in an employment relationship, but can standards be developed and 
applied for adoption among a wider constituency of policy participants? 
  
 Formal Accreditation ruled out but ‘Representativeness’ lives on: A 
Muddle in the Making? 
 
The Commission’s 2002 Communication on Consultation reflects the varying 
inputs thus outlined.  It seems to recognise the drawbacks of basing a system 
around a total reliance on what it describes as ‘representative European 
organisations’, although seems to take an ‘each-way bet’ on the concept: 
 
 ‘The Commission would like to underline the importance it attaches to input 
from representative European organisations...however, the issue of 
representativeness at European level should not be used as the only 
criterion when assessing the relevance or quality of comments.  The 
Commission will avoid consultation processes which could give the 
impression that ‘Brussels is only talking to Brussels’ as one person put it.  In 
many cases, national and regional viewpoints can be equally important in 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the member states.  
Moreover, minority views can also form an essential dimension of open 
discourse on policies.  On the other hand, it is important for the Commission 
to consider how representative views are when taking a political decision 
following a consultation process’ (European Commission, 2002a, pp. 11-12). 
 
The carefully crafted tone of this paragraph appears to signal the Commission’s 
continued dismissal of a de jure system of accreditation based on geographic 
representativeness.  Yet despite distancing itself from such a formal scheme, its 
desire to hold on to a working practice of representativeness is clear, albeit that 
precisely what this may mean and for what purpose retains its ambiguity. The 
Commission’s criterion for appointment to advisory committees is to focus ‘on the 
degree of representativeness of the group to be consulted.’xi David O’Sullivan, 
Secretary General of the European Commission, told a conference on ‘NGOs’, 
Democratisation and the Regulatory State’ in September 2003 that  
 
‘Openness and accountability are important principles for the conduct of 
organisations when they are seeking to contribute to EU policy 
development.  It must then be apparent which interests they represent, and 
how inclusive that representation is.’ (O’Sullivan, 2003, p.73; original 
emphasis). 
 
By ‘accountability,’ the Secretary General explained that he was referring both to 
the Commission’s own accountability ‘and on the organisations participating in 
consultation processes,’ (ibid.), though offered no further clarification as to the 
latter.  Indeed, the sense in which the concept has been used by the Commission 
in its application towards interest groups has historically had a ring of ambiguity 
about it, in that the uses covered appear to range from those of general public 
transparency, financial accountability, member accountability, constituency 
accountability and even public accountability. As noted above, this ambiguity has 
catalysed a degree of positioning among EU groups to try and shape accreditation 
guidelines in their own image.  Some insights into the Commission’s positions do 
however arise from his remark at the conference eventxii that ‘some NGOs are run 
along the lines of regimes we wouldn’t approve of.’  This may suggest that a key 
goal of the Commission is to achieve a set of very basic standards designed to 
screen out to the margins those organisations which are little more than a ‘one 
man band with a web site.’   
 
So, after all, the key concern of overload reveals itself as a primary motivation. A 
range of ‘new’, small, and resource challenged groups with little expertise would 
absorb too much time of the Commission. The use of accreditation mechanisms 
would exclude them while retaining the valuable input of groups that have 
expertise, cover a large proportion of a given sector in the EU and provide a good 
flow of information between member organisations and the Commission.  
 
Yet, using accreditation to flush nuisance groups out of the policy making system 
presents its own problems. The costs of such a scheme – de-jure or de-facto – 
may exceed the benefits by way of making consultation more manageable for the 
Commission. Initially, as canvassed above, it provides an opportunity for business 
groups to raise the bar for access so high as to exclude many of what it would 
consider ‘unrepresentative’ cause groups. Similarly, even cause groups may seek 
to institutionalise existing gains to the exclusion of competitor bodies. But beyond 
these issues is a larger concern about stifling democratic debate, with the 
potential to harm the already fragile democratic credentials of the EU system. At 
the very least, such organisations may be a legitimate part of the general 
plurality of civil society, and seeking to screen out such groups may end up 
restricting contributions to democratic deliberation. Moreover it offends some 
very persuasive argument about the role of removing groups from democratic 
processes.   
 
Indeed, just this type of concern emerges based on the ambiguity of the 
Commission’s Communication on Consultation, specifically the issue of selective 
consultations. Whilst recording on page 11 that ‘the Commission wishes to stress 
that it will maintain an inclusive approach in line with the principle of open 
governance’, the next paragraph records that ‘best practice requires that the 
target group should be clearly defined prior to the launch of a consultation 
process’ (European Commission, 2002a, p.11; see also Amiya-Nakada, 2004).  As 
Amiya-Nakada discovered, this latter statement drew pluralist inspired concerns 
from no less than the United States Government 
 
‘We note that references in the document to “relevant parties” or “target 
groups” also appear to suggest that the Commission’s consultation process 
may not always be open to all interested parties...we suggest that the 
Commission simply let interested parties identify themselves instead of the 
Commission pre-selecting the “relevant parties” or “target groups” to 
consult” (cited in Amiya-Nakada, 2004, pp10-11).  
  
In similar vein, the UK government responded that it ‘would welcome greater 
clarity on the selection of participants’ (UK Government, 2002, pp. 3-4).   
 
The trigger for these comments was the consultation paper which preceded the 
Communication, in which the Commission had proposed the establishment of a 
dual system of consultations, one ‘open’ and another ‘focused.’  This dual system 
had not featured in the final Communication, but current descriptions of the 
Commission’s consultation practices on its web site show it is very clearly in force 
today.xiii   
 
The Commission’s de-facto ‘partnership arrangements’ is evident in a variety of 
pockets of practice in force across the European Commission, with differing 
degrees of formality.  At the informal end of the spectrum are those between DG 
Employment and Social Affairs (DG EMP) and its various interest constituencies, 
where the Commission service has a long record of group formation and 
maintenance (see, for instance, Geyer, 2001; Martin and Ross, 2001; Cullen, 
2005) as a means of serving its ambitions to develop the course of European 
integration.  The Social Platform, and the European Women’s Lobby, in particular, 
enjoy a particularly symbiotic relationship with DG EMP (Mazey, 2000; Cullen, 
2005). Outside of this service, the survival of DG Environment is said to have 
been dependent on its core constituency of environmental interest groups (Mazey 
and Richardson, 2005).  The longest standing continuous dialogue is between DG 
Development and the Confederation of European Non-Governmental 
Organisations (CONCORD), with its regular Commissioner level meetings, 
Commission staff dedicated to NGO liaison, and its ‘guidelines for the participation 
of non-state actors in the development dialogues and consultations’ (European 
Commission, 2004).  The dialogue is perhaps the most organised of all within the 
Commission, designed around Concord’s confederal basis founded on ‘accurate 
representation’ (Concord, 2005, slide 3) of national platforms of member state 
development organisations.  Similarly, the European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) has a highly structured relationship with (around 200) NGOs, 
based around eligibility criteria for inclusion (Obradovic, 2005).  A more recent 
example (established in 1999) along similar lines is that of DG Trade’s bi-monthly 
dialogue with its very own ‘contact group’ of civil society, providing expenses for 
groups to discuss with it at Commissioner level strategic priorities.xiv  All of these 
reflect the highly institutionalised nature of European Commission/interest group 
relations, borne of the wider roles of groups charged with, inter alia, tasks as 
democratic agents. Consequently, partnership arrangements have continued to 
develop since the Commission’s apparent rejection of them following the 
Parliament’s expression of disapproval.  
 
 
Of interest is a recent reflection of the Secretary General of the Commission that 
he wouldn’t rush to repeat the representativeness idea incorporated in Social 
Partnershipxv, doubtless with a legal challenge it gave rise to in the Court of First 
Instancexvi in mind. Formal schemes seeking to apply any criteria seem well out 
of favour in the Secretariat General because of the bureaucratic minefields they 
enter and administrative costs they incur during attempts at implementation, but 
this doesn’t mean that an informal application of various principles are likewise 
treated; indeed, the political costs associated with formal schemes may make 
them unpopular, but the principles which inspired them live on in spirit through 
informal application, increasing the discretionary control available to political 
institutions much as described by the extensive principal-agent literature.  One 
consequence of this is that an informal accreditation system has a ‘privatising’ 
effect on public policy, and seems to work against the grain of the Commission’s 
substantial procedural democracy measures put in place since the White Paper on 
Governance aimed at a more systematic basis to engage with outside interests 
(for a review of these see, for instance, Curtin, 2004).  Such measures include 
comprehensive and easy access to documents, an annual work programme of 
legislation alongside consultation plans, open access single web portals for 
consultation, and consultation standards including reports on how responses were 
used to adjust proposals, in the hope of empowering interest groups as a means 
addressing asymmetries of power.  Many of these are likely to have a limited 




We started by drawing a conceptual distinction between ‘voice’ and ‘participation’ 
by interest group in political systems, and drew attention to the difficulties of 
maintaining this distinction in regulatory models.  This difficulty would initially 
seem to lend support to ‘laissez-faire,’ ‘marketplace of ideas’ models, while our 
review of regulatory models in an EU context has drawn attention to the 
difficulties and muddles which can arise from using representativeness as a 
criterion for political access.  Regulating groups for representativeness clearly 
undermines, rather than strengthens, input legitimacy on the grounds that it 
would privilege those groups whose legitimacy is based upon their ability to 
represent a given membership constituency, and would disadvantage groups 
whose legitimacy is based on their ability to place a cause in the political arena.  
Most groups at EU level seem to be able to play the ‘representativeness’ game 
through their confederated nature, as trade associations with direct company 
membership, or as policy offices of international movements.   
 
Yet the privatising effect of de-facto accreditation schemes upon public policy 
making seems to be equally problematic for democratic legitimacy, and highlights 
the problematic nature of laissez-faire models. The paradox is greatest when de-
facto accreditation is used alongside attempts to create legitimacy by developing 
a formalised set of procedures for exchanges with outside interests designed to 
address asymmetries of power, as seen in the context of the European 
Commission.   The EU is by nature a highly institutionalised system of 
engagement with outside interests, and denying the presence of a de-facto 
system of accreditation is extremely implausible.  The Commission’s tangle is 
compounded by its search to find criteria with which to simplify its consultative 
life and to screen out aggressive ‘outsider’ groups which are little more than one 
person with a web site, particularly because such groups are so few in number at 
EU level.  The starting point needs to be a different one. 
 
The European Commission’s recent emphasis upon the responsibility which 
groups bear for the information which they bring to the policy-making table 
seems to offer a way forward.  Plant has recently argued that 
 
‘Once groups seek to have a direct influence upon the political process and 
once they are drawn into the circle of consultation over policy they are no 
longer seen as just civil society organisations, and it is appropriate and 
important for the health of democratic policy making that searching 
questions are asked about representativeness and accountability’ (Plant, 
2003, p.106). 
 
This focus on enhancing input legitimacy echoes the concerns emerging view 
among NGO scholars, such as Edwards and Zadek (2002) that decision making 
roles should accompany democratic forms of representation. We concur that 
increased status implies increased scrutiny over representativeness. Policy 
makers understandably wish to know that when they hear a ‘view’ they have a 
sense of how shared this is by the broader constituency for which advocates 
purport to speak. At the EU level, the institutionalised nature of EU politics leads 
to predictable findings in some studies (Warleigh, 2001; Sudbery, 2003) that 
many groups lack active democratic process and opportunities for affiliates to 
participate in decision making (although these are repeated more boldly in nation 
states). This emphasis upon internal group democracy in exchange for access 
brings a wider set of issues.  On the one hand, while there is no guarantee that 
internal group democracies always work – or in fact deliver authoritative or 
binding positions – they do seem to offer the best prospect of this type of 
assurance in political exchanges. However, pursuit of this ideal requires one eye 
on practice; firmly held and articulated principle is not always enough. There is no 
ready policy solution ‘middle-way’ between accreditation and laissez-faire, but a 
way forward is a conclusion that a robust application of one-size-fits-all rules of 
internal democracy would clearly be counterproductive; removing large swathes 
of the group system and working against important projects of political inclusion. 
It is also not attentive to the fact that for many groups – those advocating for 
non-humans and nature particularly – divining the interests of their constituency 
over policy detail is not logically aided by ascertaining the views of affiliates. For 
these groups, the creation of assurance standards for the placement of 
information in the public domain, seeking confirmation of processes of internal 
deliberation, and ensuring they are not a ‘front’ for other interests (e.g. 
establishing a finance trail) seem to be more important questions shaping 
judgements about legitimacy than internal democratic practices.  The very recent 
(2006) development of an International NGO Charter by some of the leading NGO 
brands, and the proposal of an ‘EU Concordat’ by one civil society organisation, 
seems to be a first step on the trail of these issues and are beginning to stimulate 
debate on the EU civil society circuit.  These are likely to acquire more detail (and 
in the case of the Concordat, balance) in time, and also need to be given time to 
acquire wider currency with both civil society organisations and EU institutions, 
possibly through mechanisms such as International standards and certification 
agencies.  This would follow a long standing tradition from the European 
Commission in seeking incentivised self-regulatory solutions with a standing.  It 
may also make a contribution to the search for wider EU input legitimacy, where 
there is a question common to all democratic systems about whether engagement 
with interest groups amounts to friend (as a model of participatory democracy 
supplementing and deepening representative democracy) or foe (elites privatising 
policy-making) of participative derived legitimacy.  In the case of the European 
Union, the issue is particularly intense given the reliance upon interest groups to 
make up for deficiencies in representative democracy, such as their empowered 
role as agents of checks and balances and accountability, both upon each-other 
and upon EU political institutions. 
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